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In the Supren1e Court 
of the State of Utah 
\r ... :\.. XIELSUX. 
Plaintiff and Ht'::'Ptllltknt, 
JOH...\ \\'. S)llTH .. \~n .1. l'.:\_.2\lEHU.\ 
S1IITH. E. LlXl'I.JLX ~.\llTll. POLLY 
SlliTH. JUHX \\". ~_JUTH "\~r~ .\L\X 
G~\ILEY. Tru:'h't':' L)f tilt' Smith Laud 
Company. and S)IITH L~-\XD CU.\f-
PA~1. a Corporation, 
Defendants and ~\ppellant:3 . 
.. UBERT S. \YHEEL \YRIGHT, Tru:'tt'e 
in Bankruptcy of John \Y. Smith, 
Bankrupt. Intern~nor and Respondent, 
A....~D 
S1IITH L_\XD CO)IP ~\XY, a Cor-
poration. Plaintiff and ~-\ppellant, 
vs. 
1I. )L .Johnson. ReceiYer of Xielson-
Burton Company, Formerly a Co-Part-
nership. Composed of ~-\ .. J. Xielson and 
Charles S. Burton. f'H .. -\RLE~ D. 
)IOORE. \\IL~E .. -\. XIELSOX, 
Defendant~ anrl Re~pondPnt~. 
No.6199 
1No.6198 
\ 
I 
Appeal From Fir:-:t Di~trict Court, Boxelcler County 
Honora hlp Lester A. \Y adr>, .Juclg-r· 
Petition for Rehearing, and Support-
ing Brief 
.J. D. SKEEX, 
E .. J. SKEEK, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
W. A. NIELSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN W. SM.ITH, AND J. CAMERON 
SMITH, E. LINCOI.u.~ SMITH, POLLY 
SMITH, JOHN ,v. SMITH AND MAX 
GAILEY, Trustees of the Smith Land No.6199 
.Company, and SMITH LAND COM-
pANY. a Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ALBERTS. 'VHEELWRIGHT, Trustee 
in Bankruptcy of John W. Smith, 
Bankrupt, Intervenor and Respondent, 
AND 
SMITH Lk~D COMPANY, a Cor-
poration, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
M. M. Johnson, Receiver of Nielson-
Burton Company, Formerly a Co-Part-
nership, Composed of A. J. Nielson and 
Charles S. Burton, CHARLER D. 
MOORE, WILSE A. NIELSON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Appeal From First District Court, Boxelder County 
Honorable Lester A. Wade, Judge 
Petition for Rehearing, and Support-
ing Brief 
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Uome now the appellants in the above entitled cases, 
consolidated for hearing herein, and petition for 
rehearing herein, upon the following grounds, towit: 
1. 
1i 1he Court has failed to consider facts which show 
conclusively that predecessors in interest of :the 
plaintiff7 W. A. Nielson, in the Box Elder County 
case had notice in 1930 of the assignment of the con-
tract of purchase described in the complaint, and 
that by reason thereof, this Court has erroneously 
concluded that the cause of action sued upon was not 
barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
2. 
The Court has erroneously held and concluded that 
the notice of the transfer of the said contract of 
]Jurchase, given to the sheriff of Box Elder County, 
as agent of the plaintiff's predecessor in interest: 
was not notice to hii-; principal. 
3. 
The Court has erroneously failed to apply to this 
case the well established rule that the means of 
knowleclg·e of a fraud is equivalent to knowledge. 
4. 
~This Honorable Court erred in stating that 
''There is considerable confli~;t as to 
whether Nielson and his privies knew and 
should have known of the assignment of the 
contract to the corporation,'' 
for the reason that there is no conflict in the evi-
dence whatsoever as to facts reasonably calculated 
to give the judgment creditor notice of the assjgn-
ment to·wit: the fact that the sheriff was instructed 
to make a levy upon the property involved in this 
suit, and that he did not make the levy because he 
found that the property had bePn transferred by 
.John W. Smith, the judgment debtor. These facts 
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are shown bv d.ocmnentarv evidence - the records 
of the sheriff's office. .. 
5. 
This Honorable Court erred in concluding that the 
exact 1nethod and tune of noti<>e of modification of 
the transfer are not alleged. It is well settled that 
the plaintiff, in a suit to set aside a fraudulent con-
veyance, which is commenced more than three years 
after the conveyance, must specificaily allege facts 
which negative notice of the said conveyance, ·~·he 
burden is not on the defendant, but is on the 
plaintiff. 
6. 
The Court erred in awarding costs to the respond-
ents. 
J.D. SKEEN, 
E. J. SKEEN, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
Brief in Support of Petition for a 
Rehearing 
This petition is addressed to two issues : 
L 
The Court erred in holding that the cause 
of action in the Box Elder County case was 
not barred by the Statute cf Limitations, 
and 
2. 
The Court erred in awarding costs to 
respondents. 
The defense of the Statute of Limitations is dis-
missed by the Court with the statement: 
''There is considerable conflict as to 
'vh.ether Nielson or his privies knew or 
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4 
should have known ~f the assignment of 
the contract to the Corporation. But the 
exact method and time of notification are 
not alleged. Conditions on the farm re-
mained the same, that is, John W. Smith 
and family continued to live on and to 
operate said farm. We are, therefore, un-
able to say at what time Nielson or his 
predecessor had, or should have had, notice 
and we cannot hold the action barred hy 
the Statute of Limitations.'' 
We feel that the Court has failed to consider un-
disputed documentary evidence which, as a matter 
of law, charged the predecessor of the plaintiff 
with notice of assignment of the contract. Unaer 
date of August 16, 19.30, a few days less than five 
years before the suit was brought, a praecipe for 
execution was filed with the Clerk of the District 
Court of Box Elder County in the case of Bertha 
K. Skeen, the predecessor in interest of W. A. 
Nielson, respondent. (B. E. 272; Ab. 112). At about 
the same time, D. A. Skeen, attorney for the plain-
tiff, Bertha K. Skeen, in the same case, gave a 
praecipe to the Sheriff of Box Elder County as 
follows: 
''TO THE SHERIFF OF BOX ELDER 
COUNTY: 
You will please proceed to levy upon any 
property, ~ither real or personal, which 
you may locate belonging to defendants in 
Box Elder County, State of Utah, and 
advertise the same for sale, pursuant to 
the execution and levy as soon as you may 
do so. 
(Signed) D. A. Skeen, 
Attorney for Plaintiff.'' 
(B. E. 272; Ab. 114). 
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5 
The shel'iff made a 1·eturn dated December 3, 1930, 
as follows: 
"I, John H. Zundel, Sheriff of the County 
of Box :bJlder, State of Utah, do hereby 
certify and return, that I received the with-
in and hereunto annexed writ of execution, 
on the 26th day of September, 1930, and 
that by virtue of the same, I have made de-
mand upon the within named defendant, 
John W. Smith, for the payment of the 
within judgment, with interest and costs, 
all as more fully appears in the within writ 
of execution, the defendant stated then 
and there if I would call J. D. Skeen he 
would take care of the within judgment as 
he had the money to pay said judgment. 
I did take up the matter with J. D. Skeen, 
and on or about the 7th day of November, 
1930, I received a letter from said J. D. 
Skeen; a copy of said letter is hereto at-
tached and marked exhibit A and made a 
part of this return. 
I do further certify and return that I have 
made due and diligent search and inquiry 
within my jurisdiction and have been un-
fl hlP to find any property belonging to the 
within named defendant, but what is mort-
g-ag-ed or exempt from execution, upon 
which to levy in satisfaction of the with-
in writ. 
I therefore return the within writ un-
~atiPfied. 
Dated at Brigham City, Utah, this 3rd day 
of December, 1930 . 
. JOHN H. ZUNDEL, 
Sheriff of Box Elder County, Utah. 
(B. E. 275; Ab. 114). By .......... Deputy." 
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6 
Attached to the return as recited therein, was a 
letter from J. D. Skeen to John H. Zundel, Sheriff, 
as follows: 
''Dear Sir: 
John W. Smith has requested me to ad--
vise you that he has no money or property 
out of ·which the execution you hold against 
him might be satisfied. The property he 
occupied was sold on contract and title 
reserved to both the land and the crops. 
Any equity he might have had was sold 
some time ago. 
Respectfully, 
J.D. SKEEN.'' 
(B. E. 274; Ab. 114). 
Let us briefly review the facts. The plaintiff 
alleged in paragraph 4 of his complaint ''that upon 
the entry of said judgments, execution was issued 
thereon and delivered to the Sheriff of Box Elder 
County and said executions were duly returned by 
the said Sheriff wholly unsatisfied ... " (Ab. 2). 
It was stipulated by the respondents that no execu-
tion was issued except the one upon which the above 
return was made. (Ab. 101). The attorney who 
caused the execution to he issued in 1930 also rep-
resented W. A. Nielson in the other two cases in 
which judgments were rendered against John W. 
Smith. (Ab. 52-53). The sheriff, by his deputy, 
Joseph R. Olsen, served the execution hut was un-
able to find property belonging to the defendant. 
He pn~pared a return stating- the facts and attached 
thereto the letter from .T. D. Skeen. The return 
hears the date December 3, 19~0. ( Ab. 115). 
The facts stated above are not in conflict. There 
is not a word of evidence to the contrary. In 
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order to defeat the defense of the Statute of Lim-
itations, the Court n1ust hold that under the~e cir-
cumstances the plaintiff and Bertha K. Skeen, his 
predecessor, were under no duty to make inquiry. 
It must hold that they had no means of knowing 
the fact of the transfer. Here we have an attor-
ney directing tl1e sheriff to make a levy upon the 
property of the defendant, and we have a return 
prepared which stated that the property the defend-
ant was purchasing under contract had been sold 
some time ago. It is reasonable to presume that 
the attorney was advised, orally at least, that the 
levy had not been made. The plaintiff paid the 
sheriff for the service; and is it the ordinary thing 
to cause issuance of execution and then wonder 
for five years whether it had been served 1 Of 
course it is not. It may be presumed that the attor-
ney made inquiry and was told that the levy on ex-
ecution was not made, because the equity in the 
land evidenced bv the oontrnct Iiad been tr)ans-
ferred. He did n~t deny that he had discussed the 
matter with the sheriff. He simply did not recall! 
(~<\b. 105). 
The test as to what facts constitute such means 
of knowledge as to be the equivalent thereof is well 
stated in the Utah case-
.Jonns ~fining- Co. v. Cardiff ~lining· & ?Jill 
Co., 56 Utah 449; 191 P. 426, as follows: 
''In all sueh cases the statute begins to 
run from the time the complaining party 
discovered the wrongs complained of or 
'when he ·was avprised of such facts and 
circumstances with respect thereto as would 
put a person of ordinary intelligence and 
pnulence upon inquiry. The law is stated 
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to that effect by this Court in the ca;:;e of 
Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 248 ; 158 Pac. 
426, and in Salt Lake City v. Investment 
Co., 43 Utah 181 ; 134 Pac. 603. If there-
fore the facts and circumstances which 
came to the knowledge of the plaintiff cor-
poration were such as would have caused a 
person of ordinary prudence and intelli-
gence to act, then it should have acted, and 
the statute of limitations was set in motion 
as to it." 
It is submitted that a "person of ordinary prudence 
and intelligence'' would inquire of the sheriff as to 
the reason for not making the levy, and would have 
been in a position to know all of the facts. This 
rule is based on sound reasoning. A person who 
claims that he has been defrauded should be dil-
igent in pursuing his remedies. Otherwise, equities 
of third persons attach, evidence is lost and de-
stroyed, witnesses die and proof becomes difficult. 
As stated by the California Supreme Court, 
" ... A party who has the opportunity 
of knowing the facts constituting the fraud 
of which he complains; cannot be supine 
and inactive, and afterwards allege a want 
of knowledge that arose by reason of his 
own laches or negligence.'' 
Shain v. Sresovich, 104 Cal., at p. 405; 
38 P. at p. 42. 
The respondent could have known all the facts if 
he had said, ''Sheriff, what did you levy on in the 
John W. Smith case'" HP would have learned 
all about the transaction then. We think he knew 
all about it in 1930) and that no other inference 
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9 
fron1 the evidence is reasonable. Vl e believe that 
he stood by and remained inactive for a purpose. 
If he had brought this suit in 1930 and had been 
successful) he would have re<'overed only a con-
tract for purchase, badly in arrears, and subject 
to large tax delinquencies. That is the reason he 
did not start the suit in 1930. Meanwhile Olsen, 
the deputy sheriff died. 
Unless this Court repudiates the fundamental rule 
that knowledge gained by an agent in the course of 
his duty i~ knowledg·e of his principal, the Court 
must hold that as a matter of law, the Statute of 
Limitations started to run in Deeember, 1930, and 
the cause of action is barred. The ~heriff was em~ 
nloyed to make the levy and was the agent of the 
judgment creditor. He knew of the transaction in 
December, 1930. 
The burden of alleging lack of notice is on the 
plaintiff as is also the burden of proof of facts 
which would excuse him from bringing the suit at 
an earlier date. No such facts are alleged and 
none proved. There is no claim that the defendant 
concealed anythin~. The Court was in error when 
it stated that the appellants had failed to allege 
"the exact method and time of notification." The 
burden was the other way. 
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135; 25 L. 
Ed. 807. 
The facts discussed above are not even mentioned 
in the opinion of this Court. We feel that in all 
fairness this phase of the case should he re-
considered and a rehearing granted. 
Although the Court has ordered modification of the 
judgme-nt by reducing it approximately one-third, 
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10 
eosts are aBsessed against the appellant. \Ve 
realize that assessment _of costs is discretionary, 
but believe that where a litigant is faced with a 
judgment which is excessive to the extent of at 
_least one-third (as found by this Court) costs should 
not be assessed against him, if as in this case he 
is successful in getting the judgment modified to 
that extent. Judgment for costs should be for 
appellant, or should be divided. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J.D. SKEEN, 
E. J. SKEEN, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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